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Abstract
This paper evaluates the performance of charter elementary schools in Los Angeles County in three ways.
First, I compare charter school performance to public school performance, controlling for a number of key
characteristics. Second, I study the characteristics that appear to influence charter school success as compared
to public school success. Third, I study the “competitive effect” of charter schools, examining how
geographical proximity to charter schools affects the performance of traditional public schools. I find evidence
that, ceteris paribus, traditional public schools score higher than charter schools, except in majority African
American schools. Further, I find that the opening of charter schools affects nearby traditional public schools
negatively.
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Introduction 
  
One of the rallying calls of proponents of “school choice” reforms is that 
introducing competition into the school system will improve the effectiveness of teachers 
and principals, and enhance overall student achievement. Central to the school choice 
movement is the advent of charter schools, schools funded publicly but operated largely 
privately. Charter school legislation was first passed in 1991. Since then over 4700 
charter schools have been introduced in 40 states (CREDO, 2009). In addition, President 
Obama has made charter schools one of the focal points of his education agenda.  
The growth of charter schools has fueled a national debate about the advantages 
and disadvantages of a more market-based public school system. Advocates of the charter 
school movement argue that charter schools not only provide attendees with a higher 
quality education, but also spur nearby traditional public schools (TPS) to higher 
performance through a competitive effect. Opponents argue that charter schools 
undermine the goals and ideals of public education, and do not perform better than 
traditional public schools. I use data from Los Angeles County elementary schools to test 
empirically 1) whether charter schools indeed outperform traditional public schools, 2) 
what sorts of elementary charter schools have been most successful in L.A., and 3) 
whether the introduction of charter schools causes nearby traditional public schools to 
perform better (what I call the competitive effect).  
 
Background  
  
Charter schools receive public funding, but are not subject to all the regulations 
imposed on traditional public schools. They remain accountable, though, to their local 
school board or state sponsoring agency, with low performance often leading to closure. 
High-demand, oversubscribed charter schools admit students based on a lottery system, 
not on previous grades or test scores. In 26 states and Washington, DC, the number of 
charter schools that can exist at any point is capped, which can lead to oversubscription 
and long charter school wait lists (National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 2009). 
Charter schools, on average, receive less funding per pupil than similar public schools; 
however, they often do not enroll as many students requiring special education or support 
services. A 2008 study on charter school funding in 40 states and Washington, DC found 
charter school funding to average just $6,585 per student annually, compared with 
$10,771 at TPSs (Center for Education Reform, 2008).  
California passed legislation allowing for the introduction of charter schools in 
1992, preceded only by Minnesota. Since then, California has become home to more 
charter schools than any other state. Original legislation in the Charter Schools Act 
restricted the number of charters in California to 100. This cap was later amended in 1998 
to allow an additional 100 charter schools each year. As of 2006, 1 out of 20 public 
schools in California was a charter school, and 1 out of 50 students attended charter 
schools  (American Institutes for Research, 2006). California’s charter schools are 
concentrated in urban areas, with LAUSD (Los Angeles Unified School District) by far 
the most charter-friendly district in the state. Los Angeles County has in total over 270 
charter schools (California Department of Education, 2012).  
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 Charter schools are established by business-people, parents, or other community 
members interested in starting and running a school. In order to open a school in 
California, founders must present their ideas and strategies to the governing board of their 
home school district. If the petition is approved on a local level, the proposal is then 
submitted to the State Department of Education. At this point, the petitioners apply for an 
implementation grant. If approved, the school is funded by the state, with the amount of 
funding generally based on average attendance (proposed attendance in a school’s first 
year). After the expiration of the first five-year term, the school must be reapproved by 
the school board in order to retain funding (Wok, 2012).  
 If a charter school’s initial petition is denied, the founders can try to improve their 
petition and reapply, or they can appeal to the County Office of Education. According to 
a representative of the California Department of Education (CDE), petitions are judged 
based on their satisfaction of legal requirements, their comprehensiveness, and the 
capability of the people making the petition (Wok, 2012). According to the CDE 
representative, the biggest hurdle in general for potential charter schools is finding a 
suitable facility.  
 
Literature Review 
  
There is not a consensus in the existing literature on whether charter schools 
outperform traditional public schools. There is also not a consensus on whether charter 
schools exert a positive competitive effect. Further, there has yet to be published a study 
specifically of Los Angeles schools, although several studies have investigated the whole 
of California’s charter schools.  The most comprehensive, up-to-date study of charter 
school effectiveness is a 2009 study by the Stanford Center for Research on Educational 
Outcomes (CREDO, 2009). The study, using data from 16 states as well as Washington 
D.C., did not find charter schools to consistently outperform or under-perform traditional 
public schools. In five states, charter schools statistically significantly outperformed 
TPSs, while in six states TPSs outperformed charter schools. In the remaining states 
results were inconclusive. Some other interesting findings were that elementary and 
middle school charters on average performed better (compared to traditional public 
school counterparts) than charter high schools. Further, charter schools were found to be 
more effective for students who had spent several years at the school already. 
 In California specifically, a 2005 RAND study found students in start-up charters 
to outperform comparable traditional public school students (Zimmer, 2005). However, 
conversion charters (charters converted from TPSs vs. opened independently) did not 
outperform traditional public schools. Further, charter schools with some independent 
study or distance-learning component performed worse than traditional public schools. 
The study also found no measurable competitive effect when looking at the whole of 
California’s charter schools. 
 Studies comparing charter school and traditional public school performance 
generally use OLS models. One potential issue with such studies is that students will self-
select into charter schools or traditional public schools, introducing the problem of 
omitted variable bias. To correct for this problem, analyses generally control for student 
body indicators such as race, percentage of students on free or reduced lunch programs, 
and student-teacher ratio. Studies have shown that, in California, charter schools do not 
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generally “skim” high-performing students from traditional public schools (American 
Institutes for Research, 2006). On the contrary, charter school students are generally 
lower-performing, due partly to the fact that charter schools are often in poorer, urban 
areas. If student level data are available, researchers often also use student fixed-effects, 
through which they can track individual students, in order to neutralize this source of 
selection bias.  
 There is only a small body of literature assessing the charter school competitive 
effect.  Hoxby (2003) provided the first major study of competitive charter school effects, 
focusing specifically on charter schools in Michigan and Arizona. She finds charter 
school introduction to have a positive, statistically significant competitive effect on 
nearby traditional public schools. Bettinger (2005) also tests Michigan charters, using an 
instrumental variable to control for school placement, and fails to find a robust 
competitive effect.  Bifulco and Ladd (2006), looking at North Carolina charters, also fail 
to find a robust competitive effect. However, Booker et al (2006) and Sass (2006) find a 
small, positive competitive effect in Texas and Florida, respectively. Buddin and Zimmer 
(2010) fail to find a competitive effect of charter school introduction in California. 
Buddin and Zimmer also use interviews with TPS principals to add qualitative depth to 
their study. They find that principals, in general, feel little competitive pressure from the 
opening of charter schools. Most recently, Imberman (2011) finds that charter school 
openings have a negative effect on TPS performance at the elementary level, but a 
positive competitive effect at the middle and high school level.  
 The main econometric issue one encounters in studying the competitive effect is 
endogeneity associated with time and location of charter school openings. The problem, 
in theory, is that the location of charter schools is not randomly determined; rather, 
charter schools locate (temporally and spatially) in areas where schools are doing poorly. 
If charter schools aim to substitute for public schools where public schools are not doing 
a satisfactory job, then charter schools will generally open in areas with low TPS 
performance. According to this theory, any analysis of competitive effects failing to 
account for endogeneity of school location would likely find charter school openings to 
be correlated with low TPS performance.  
The competitive effects studies in general use a difference-in-difference approach 
to reduce the issue of endogeneity in estimating the competitive effect. Another method 
to control for endogeneity is to instrument for charter school opening. Bettinger (2005) 
and Imberman (2011) employ this technique, with Bettinger using the instrumental 
variable (IV) of proximity to a university, and Imberman using an IV based on property 
available in a specific area. Bettinger and Imberman select variables (proximity to a 
university and number of properties near a TPS with between 20,000 and 100,000 square 
feet of building space respectively) that they argue are correlated with the opening of a 
charter school, and correlated with performance of nearby public schools only through 
the mechanism of charter openings (the exclusion restriction). In the first stage of the 
2SLS regression, they estimate the opening of charter schools based on their respective 
instrumental variables. In the second stage, they estimate the impact of the opening of 
charter schools on TPS performance, using results from the first stage as right hand side 
variables. This technique accounts for endogeneity, and gives an unbiased estimate of the 
impact of charter schools on nearby TPSs.  
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Due to difficulty in finding a suitable IV, this study resolves the endogeneity issue 
by both measuring changes in TPS performance (as opposed to levels) as the dependent 
variable, and also by controlling for past performance of TPSs. Given that any 
endogeneity due to past changes in API performance is captured by lags, this study 
should not suffer from bias due to endogeneity.  
 
School Choice and Competitive Effects Theories 
  
This study tests two theories: first, that charters achieve higher levels of 
performance than TPSs, and second, that the introduction of charter schools results in 
better outcomes for nearby traditional public schools. In this section, I further explore the 
economic roots of the theories, and explore a few reasons why they may not actually 
apply to charter school implementation in the U.S.  
 The notion that charter schools should perform better than traditional public 
schools stems from the idea that markets promote efficiency. While charter schools in 
California are subject to many of the same rules and regulations as traditional public 
schools, they also have more scope to operate independently. Charter schools are less 
subject to inefficiencies posed by the teachers’ union, are less restricted in terms of 
curriculum, and are able to experiment with innovative methods like extending the school 
day (American Institutes for Research, 2006). Despite these factors, the existing literature 
does not support the hypothesis that charter schools consistently outperform traditional 
public schools. This may be due to low levels of information for “choosers” (parents), 
student composition bias, lower funding levels, or simply the fact that choice does not 
always promote better outcomes.  
 The theory that charter school openings should impact TPSs positively views 
schools and families, at least in part, as rational, utility-maximizing actors. Most 
basically, parents try to maximize the educational gains for their children through school 
selection, and schools aim to maintain the public funding that will allow them to remain 
open. 
 With the above assumptions in place, one can model the performance of public 
schools as a function of, among other variables, the competition that they face for public 
funding. If “funding follows the student,” one can then equate competition for public 
funding with competition for students (Hoxby, 2003). In this model, enhancing the level 
of competition for students in a certain district by introducing charter schools should spur 
public schools to improve their performance.   
However, there are several reasons to think that the “school competition” model 
does not aptly describe public school dynamics in the U.S. For one, the argument has 
been made that teachers do not need externally imposed incentives because of an intrinsic 
drive to educate students. Further, they are already held accountable through “standards 
based education reform,” a key attribute of NCLB in which public schools are held 
accountable for providing students with a certain level of proficiency as measured by 
standardized testing. While these sources of motivation may be enough for some 
teachers, it is likely that some teachers do respond to external, economic incentives. 
Additionally, even teachers who are largely self-motivated are not immune to external 
incentives.  
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Second, researchers must also take into account the level of the incentives at play. 
If a principal at a traditional public school feels competition from a nearby charter, the 
question remains whether he/she will be able to marshal meaningful incentives to relay 
the competitive effect to teachers, whose actions are ultimately responsible, to a large 
degree, for student learning.  
Third, a competitive effect will only take hold in a policy environment where the 
“money follows the student” (Hoxby, 2003). If failing schools lose students to charter 
schools, but are then provided additional funding in order to fix their deficiencies, 
teachers at the failing schools will not have any incentive to improve. In California, 
however, while the school funding scheme is quite complex, money is generally awarded 
to schools on a per-student basis (Bersin, 2008). While this sort of system may promote a 
competitive effect, it may not be observed in the data. If schools that lose students to 
charter schools also lose funding, the loss of funding will likely impact performance 
negatively, possibly negating any competitive effect.  
On the demand side, further reason to question the competitive effects theory is 
that parents often do not have full information on the quality of schools in their district. 
Even if they do, studies have shown that they frequently fail to respond to failing schools 
by seeking alternatives like charter schools (CREDO, 2009). One reason may be that, 
outside of the big names like KIPP, charter schools have not been shown to consistently 
outperform traditional public schools. Further, issues of convenience, friends, and 
uncertainty add additional costs to parents sending their child to a new school. In other 
words, for parents to have their children switch schools, the new school must exceed the 
old school in quality by more than the cost of the change.  
Despite the myriad doubts, the “school competition” theory remains compelling, 
and is worth testing empirically due to the implications of the results for the charter 
school movement.  
 
Data 
  
This study uses yearly API scores from the CDE for Los Angeles County TPSs 
and charter schools from 1998 through 2009, as well as CDE data on other school-level 
variables such as percent of students on free or reduced lunch programs, student-teacher 
ratio, and percentage minority. I selected 1998 to 2009 based on data availability, as well 
as the fact that a large number of charter schools have opened over that period. The data 
set contains a total of 11258 API score observations amongst 1208 LA County public and 
charter schools. 
The API is a single number, from 200 to 1000, reflecting a school’s performance 
on statewide assessments in a number of academic areas. It was instituted as the 
cornerstone of California’s 1999 Public Schools Accountability Act. The API score relies 
heavily on standardize testing, primarily the CST and CAHSEE. However, it also takes 
into account factors like attendance and graduation rates. Certain funding awards and 
incentives are based on API improvement (CDE). 
To construct the “charter competition” variables, I use Geographical Information 
Systems (GIS) software to geo-code addresses from the CDE website for elementary 
TPSs and charter schools. Geo-coding software takes the addresses and places them on a 
map in the GIS program. I first create a 5-mile buffer around each public school, and 
5
Trachtman: Competitive Effects of Charter School Openings
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2012
  
 
 
create a variable indicating the number of charter schools within the buffer. I then 
determine the closest charter school to each TPS, and record the distance as the crow 
flies.  
I also conducted two interviews. In the first, I talked with a CDE representative 
about the process for starting a charter school. In the second, I talked with a teacher at a 
traditional public school about competition from charter schools.  
 
Models and Results 
 
Part 1: Comparing Charter and TPS performance 
 
In Part 1 of this study, I compare elementary charter school and TPS API score 
performance from 1998 through 2009. Los Angeles County contains 84 elementary 
charter schools, compared to 1224 elementary traditional public schools. Table 1 shows 
several summary statistics with respect to these schools. Mean API score for charter 
schools over the period was 788.92, with a low of 410.8 and a high of 910.6. Charter 
schools, on average, sustained an annual increase of 14.5 API points, or 3.7 percentage 
points. Charter schools tended to be substantially smaller than TPSs, with fewer students 
on free or reduced lunches, fewer minority students, and smaller class sizes.   
For traditional public schools, mean API score over the period was 719.92, with a 
low of 311 and a high of 988. API score on average rose by 1.92 percentage points over 
the period.   
 Figures 1 and 2 show no significantly disruptive outliers in API scores. The 
Charter and TPS API distribution shown have a rightward skewness, reflecting more 
variation in scores at the lower end of the distribution than at the upper end.  
 The base API regression for school i in year t is:  
 
APIit=β1+ β2Charteri+ β3’Xit+ δt+ εit                                                                              (1) 
 
Charter is a dummy variable indicating charter status, while Xit indicates a vector of 
control variables, and δτ is a vector of year fixed effects. The control variables in the 
basic regression include total enrollment, percentage of students on free or reduced 
meals, percent of students from minority backgrounds, average pupils per teacher, 
average class sizes, and a set of dummy variables for the most highly represented ethnic 
group at the school. 
I do not use lagged API on the right hand side because a Woodridge test for 
autocorrelation indicates serial autocorrelation of error terms to be an issue, even when 
including up to five lagged values of API. Keeping lagged API terms on the right hand 
side would thus cause estimation bias.  
While inspection of residuals does not immediately indicate heteroskedasticity, a 
Breusch-Pagan test on the residuals of the base regression indicates that error terms are 
heteroskedastic (chi-squared=104.21, p<.0001). I also need to account for the serial 
correlation discussed above. Further, I adjust standard errors based on district clustering. 
The standard errors I use are clustered and robust to serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity. The results of the base regression can be viewed in Table 2. 
6
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 9 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 11
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol9/iss1/11
  
 
 
 Despite the fact that charter schools, on average, have higher API scores than 
TPSs, the charter dummy shows up negative in the basic regression, with a coefficient of 
-6.96. This result is not significant, though. The negative result is related to the control 
variables. Charter schools, on average, have lower total enrollment, lower percentage of 
students on free or reduced school lunches, and lower percentage of minority students 
than traditional public schools. All three of these variables carry statistically significant 
negative coefficients in the base regression. Thus, if charter schools had the same general 
characteristics as TPSs, the model suggests they would score worse on the API. The R 
squared for the base regression is .76, indicating that the chosen variables explain a good 
deal of the variation in API scores. Consistent with previous studies, percentage minority 
and percentage of students on free meals are negative predictors of API score, while 
majority Asian is the strongest positive predictor of API score.  
 The results of the base regression are robust to transformations of the dependent 
variable (API scores). I first use a log transformation of API (Column 2), which yields a 
coefficient of -.0143 on the charter dummy, also insignificant at the 5% level. Second, I 
use the change in API scores (Column 3) from one year to the next as the dependent 
variable. With differences in API scores as the dependent variable, using four lagged 
differences in API on the left hand side neutralizes serial correlation in the error term. I 
thus include these terms in the regression, and also include one lagged API level term to 
control for regression to the mean. This transformation yields a coefficient on the charter 
dummy of -10.32, indicating that a school’s charter status results in a reduction in 
improvement of over 10 points each year. Finally, I use percent change in API as the 
dependent variable (Column 4), once again including four lagged values of the dependent 
variable on the left hand side. The coefficient on charter status of -.649 is not statistically 
significant.  
In a second modification to the base regression, I introduce interaction variables 
between the charter dummy and important control variables like pupils per teacher and 
percentage of students on free or reduced meals. Introducing interactions controls not 
only for characteristics of each school, but also for the impact of certain characteristics 
when they are observed in charter schools. For example, the coefficient on the interaction 
variable between minority and charter gives the impact on test scores of percent minority 
specifically in charter schools. The regressions with interaction terms included can be 
viewed in Table 3.  
Including the interaction term in the model results in a substantial increase in the 
magnitude of the negative charter coefficient. The coefficient on charter becomes  
significantly different from 0 at the 5% level. Coefficients are similarly larger with 
transformations of API levels as dependent variables.  
Interestingly, both the interaction between charter and majority black, the 
interaction between charter and majority white, and the interaction between charter and 
percentage minority turn out statistically significant and positive. This indicates that, 
while charter status generally results in lower performance, the effect is mitigated if a 
school is majority black, majority white, or has a high percentage of minority students. 
Charter status has a highly negative impact (controlling for important characteristics) for 
majority-Hispanic schools, which encompass 40% of LA County’s charter schools.  
There are several potential challenges to these results. The largest is that, due to 
lack of student-level data, I am not able to track the movement of students from TPSs to 
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charter schools. In other words, I am not able to control for characteristics of students 
outside of the control variables on the general characteristics of the schools. It could be 
the case that there are unobservable characteristics of students who choose to go to 
charter schools that are driving the results. If we think that charter school students tend to 
have positive “unobservables,” then the charter school dummy should be even more 
negative. If we think charter school students have negative “unobservables,” this might 
explain the negative coefficient on the charter dummy.  
Studies in California have shown, though, that charter schools do not seem to 
skim higher-performing students from TPSs; rather, they seem to take on low-performing 
students. (Buddin, 2006) This may be due to the fact that charter schools locate in poorer, 
urban areas, where sudents are generally lower-performing on standardized tests. If this is 
the case, the included controls should account for this effect. It could be though, that 
other negative “unobservables” are driving the lower performance of charter schools, 
which would call into question the findings of this study. Further student-level research is 
necessary to determine whether this is indeed the case.  
 
Part 2: Focusing on Charter School Performance 
 
In Part 2 of this study, I focus specifically on charter school performance, 
examining how charter schools differ from TPSs in terms of the factors that impact API 
performance.  
In order to test empirically the differences between charter school and TPS factors 
that lead to API success, I run the base regression (Equation 1) first on the sample of 
charter schools, and then on the set of observations encompassing only TPSs. Then, I 
compare the coefficients from each regression, looking for significant differences. The 
results of these regressions are in Table 4.   
There are several coefficients that vary dependent on whether one looks at charter 
or traditional public schools. Most striking is that amongst TPSs, the dummy variable 
“black” is strongly negative (in both levels and % change), while in the charter set the 
dummy variable shows up positive, although only weakly significant (10% level) due to 
the small sample size. This is an interesting result, indicating that majority black schools, 
on average, do far better if they are charter schools. Percentage minority also has a 
statistically significant negative coefficient for TPSs, but a small positive coefficient for 
charter schools. This indicates that, ceteris paribus, higher-minority schools will tend to 
do better if they are chartered. While other coefficients, such as number of teachers and 
pupils per teacher, vary as well, their variation is not statistically significant.  
The descriptive statistics support the regression results that majority black schools 
perform better if they are chartered. Table 5 shows that mean API for majority-black 
TPSs over the period was just 663.72, but for majority-black charter schools was 757.01, 
an increase of over 14%. While majority-white and majority-Hispanic schools also 
performed better if they were chartered, the gains were not nearly as great as for 
majority-Black, and can be attributed (based on previous regression results) to other 
school and student composition characteristics.  
 Aside from school ethnic makeup, I am also interested in how the performance of 
charter schools varies depending on two charter-specific variables: first, when the charter 
school was opened, and second, whether the charter school is a startup or conversion. 
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Startup charters are charter schools opened in a new location. Conversion charters, on the 
other hand, are charter schools that were converted from TPSs or private schools. Around 
60% of the charter elementary schools in LA County are startups, compared to 40% 
conversion.  
Charter schools in LA County are more likely to have been opened in recent 
years, as Figure 3 demonstrates. A high number were opened shortly after charter 
legislation in 1992, followed by a stretch of fewer openings lasting until around 2003. 
From 2003 to 2010, a large number of charters were opened in each year.  
In order to test the impact of number of years in existence and type, I restrict the 
sample to charter schools, and run the base regression including the two new variables 
(years_existed and type).  
 
APIit=β1+ β2Years_existed + β3Type + β4Lagged_APIit+ β5’Xit+ δt+ εit                          (2) 
 
The results of this regression are reported in Table 6. 
Judging by API levels, the number of years a charter school has existed 
(calculated as 2012 minus the year the school was founded) positively affects 
performance. While the coefficient of 1.4 is small, it is significant at the 5% level. It 
indicates that, ceteris paribus, each year a charter school has existed will raise its API 
score by 1.4 points. It makes intuitive sense that a charter school will improve as it 
becomes more entrenched in a community. Further, the fact that a charter school has not 
been closed after the five-year trial period indicates decent performance.  
The coefficient on the dummy variable startup, on the other hand is strongly 
negative. The coefficient on the variable startup indicates that ceteris paribus, a school 
being a startup vs. a conversion charter decreases API score by around 71 points, and 
decreases average yearly improvement by 7.7 percentage points. However, the result is 
only significant with API levels as the dependent variable, and at the 10% level (due to 
small sample size). This result indicates that the existing infrastructure that comes with 
being a conversion charter school is beneficial to the school’s performance. It also runs 
contrary to the findings of Buddin (2006).  
The most important challenge for these results is, once again, the possibility of 
omitted variable bias. It could be the case that the black variable for charter schools 
reflects some characteristic of black students who attend charter schools that is not 
captured by other control variables. For the data on startup vs. conversion, it is also 
possible that there is some unobserved aspect of startup charter schools, such as bias in 
geographical location, that leads to persistently lower API scores. That being said, the 
results are quite convincing that charter schools are 1) better at educating black students 
than TPSs, 2) generally do better when they are converted from traditional public schools 
versus started up independently, and 3) improve with age.  
 
Part 3: The Competitive Effect  
  
In Part 3 of this study, I examine whether the geographic proximity of charter 
schools has an impact on the performance of traditional public schools. To do so, I 
generate several geography-related variables from GIS: 1) the name of the nearest charter 
to each traditional public school, 2) the distance (in feet, as the crow flies) to that charter 
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and 3) the number of charters in a 5-mile radius from each TPS. Figure 4 shows the 
location of all elementary charter and TPSs in LA County. I also control for the distance 
to the nearest private elementary school and the number of private elementary schools in 
a 5-mile radius. These variables are meant to account for any competitive effect 
stemming from private schools. Table 7 lists elementary charter schools in LA county, 
and also gives the number of public schools for which they are set as the nearest charter 
school.   
The mean distance to the nearest charter school for a TPS is 38,770 ft, with a 
minimum of 30 feet and a maximum of over 2 million feet. There are an average of 6 
charter schools within a 5-mile radius of each TPS, with a minimum of 0 and a maximum 
of 44. Both distance to and number of charter schools’ distributions are skewed to the 
left, with long tails to the right (figures 5 and 6).  
In order to test the impact of geographical proximity to charter schools on TPS 
performance, I create variables reflecting characteristics of the nearest charter school. 
First, I look at when the nearest charter school was opened. I create a dummy variable 
called year_of, which registers as a 1 if the API being reported is in the year that the 
nearest charter school was opened and a 0 otherwise. I continue creating a set of dummy 
variables for each year following or preceding the opening of the nearest charter school. 
These variables indicate the impact on API scores for being in the year “x” years before 
or after the opening of a charter school nearby.  
 I run the base regression, except in this model I use percent changes in API as the 
dependent variable, restrict the sample to TPSs, and include the discussed geographic 
proximity variables. I only use differences (in percentage terms) here to reduce issues of 
endogeneity, which I will discuss in a subsequent section. Due to lack of serial 
correlation issues with the differenced variable on the left hand side, I am able to control 
for lagged values. The following represents the model I test in this section.  
 
%∆APIit=β1+ β2count + β3distance_charter + β4’year_open + β5’Lagged_%∆APIit+ 
β5’Xit+ δt+ εit                                                                                                                    (3) 
 
For each TPS in the sample, count gives the number of charter schools within a 5-
mile radius, distance_charter gives the distance to the nearest charter school, and 
year_open is a vector of dummy variables indicating when the nearest charter school was 
opened. For example, if year_of is coded as a 1 for a given observation, it indicates that 
the nearest charter school was opened in that year. If the variable three_years_after is 
coded as a 1, it indicates that the observation year is three years after the opening of the 
nearest charter school. Further, if the variable three_years_before is coded as a 1, it 
indicates that the observation year is three years before the opening of the nearest charter 
school. This is intended to capture the competitive effect of the opening of the school in 
subsequent years, as well as the possible competitive effect in the buildup to the opening 
of the school. The results of this regression are in Table 8. Column 1 indicates the base 
regression, with Column 2 representing a robustness check.  
 In the base regression (Column 1), both distance and count show up statistically 
significant at the 5% level. The coefficient on distance indicates that a greater distance to 
the nearest charter increases API improvement, suggesting that a charter in close 
proximity has a negative effect. The coefficient on count indicates that each additional 
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charter school within a 5-mile radius reduces charter school API improvement by .05 
percentage points. This result suggests that the presence of charter schools in an area 
hurts the performance of TPSs. In the base regression, the only significant charter 
opening indicator variables are those representing one, three, and four years after an 
opening. The coefficients are negative as well, suggesting that charter school openings 
are negative predictors of future API scores. 
Column 2 introduces a robustness check in which I control for several 
characteristics of the nearest charter school: total enrollment, percentage of students on 
free or reduced lunches, percentage students who are minorities and API score of the 
charter school. Due to data limitations, controlling for these variables reduces the sample 
size. In this model, due to lower sample size, the negative coefficient on the variable for 
count loses strength, becoming no longer significant at the 5% level. Also, the distance 
variable switches signs, indicating that the effect of distance to the nearest charter schools 
is not robust. An interesting result with this robustness check is that the coefficient on 
year_of becomes statistically significant and negative, with a coefficient of -2.06, while 
the coefficient on four_years_after loses power, no becoming longer statistically 
significant. This result indicates that, controlling for charter school characteristics, the 
opening of a charter school still hurts nearby TPSs, but the effect is stronger in the year of 
or soon after its opening.   
 Overall, I find evidence to reject the hypothesis that charter schools exert a 
positive competitive effect on nearby TPSs. To the contrary, I find that both the presence 
of charter schools and the opening of new charter schools to be correlated with reductions 
in TPS API improvement. Further, I find that these negative effects, once one controls for 
charter school characteristics, are observed most strongly in the year that the charter 
school opens and the year after. There is also some evidence that these negative effects 
are observed three to four years after the opening of a charter school.   
The two most likely explanations for the negative effect are loss of students and 
loss of funding, which are actually very much intertwined. While past studies of Los 
Angeles schools have not found charter schools to “skim” the highest performing 
students from TPSs (Buddin, 2006), it could be that there are still unobservables at play 
here. For example, while it has been shown that the highest performing students do not 
disproportionately leave TPSs for charter schools, it could be that students with high 
improvement potential disproportionately move from TPSs to charter schools. This sort 
of bias could result in the observed negative effect—if students with high improvement 
potential leave TPSs for charters, TPSs will experience lower improvement in years of 
and after nearby charter school openings.  
Second, loss of funding that comes with students leaving for charter schools could 
negatively impact the performance of TPSs. Los Angeles public schools are funded based 
on their student populations (Robertson, 2012). While this was previously cited as a 
reason to think positive competition may take place, it could actually lower TPS 
performance in years following the opening of nearby charter schools (assuming students 
transfer from nearby TPSs to that charter). Even if schools have fewer students to 
educate, loss of funding could force them to cut programs, fire teachers, or take other 
measures likely to inhibit learning. Thus, the effect of the opening of charter schools 
could run both directions, both stimulating competition and reducing a school’s 
resources. These factors do not explain, though, why TPSs do not improve their 
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performance in the years leading up to the opening of a charter school, when they know a 
charter school will soon exist nearby, but have not yet experienced budget cuts. This 
result calls into question any sort of positive competitive effect in elementary schools.  
There are several potential issues with the presented results. First, the distance 
variable is not a very precise measure of competitive effect. There are many possible 
unobservables that could be associated with both closeness of the nearest charter school 
and API improvement. This may explain why the distance variable switches sign based 
on model specifications. 
Second, I do not have data to account for a situation in which a charter school 
opens near a TPS, and then another charter school opens even closer to the same TPS. In 
this case, the data do not capture the effect of the first charter school, due to the fact that 
the GIS program is only capable of finding and recording the nearest charter school. The 
ability to find and record all instances of charter school openings would add depth to the 
analysis.   
 
Part 4: Endogeneity Checks and Determinants of Charter Location 
 
In order to confirm that bias of charter school openings is not severely impacting 
the results, I run auxiliary regressions on the determinants of charter school openings. 
These tests can also help determine factors that influence the location and timing of 
charter school openings. I specifically am testing for whether past changes in API scores 
of TPSs encourage charters to open nearby. I model characteristics indicating charter 
school proximity to each TPS as a function of the general control variables (from 
Equation 1), API and percent change API, and their lags going back five years.   
 
Charter_Proximityit=β1+ β2’APIit + β3’chAPI+ β4’Xit+ δt+ εit                                     (4) 
 
The variables for charter proximity that I test are the number of charter schools within a 
five mile radius of each TPS, the distance to the nearest charter school, and the indicator 
variable year_of (coded as a 1 for the year the nearest charter school opens). I am 
interested here in whether the coefficient on percent_change_API for the present year or 
any lagged years is significant. This would indicate that charter location is endogenous to 
the trends in API scores, which would challenge the results in the previous section. The 
results of this test are in Appendix, Table 9. 
 With the number of charter schools in a 5-mile radius as the dependent variable, 
several lags of both API and percent change in API are significant and negative. This 
indicates that poor API scores in the past for TPSs are correlated with a higher number of 
charter schools in the area. This somewhat calls into question the previous results linking 
number of charter schools in an area to performance of TPSs. However, controlling for 
past API changes in that regression should at least partly solve this issue. Further, the 
relation between number of charters and performance is not the strongest evidence in that 
section of a negative competitive effect, so the possible endogeneity issues should not 
affect the conclusions. While several lags of API levels are also significant, this is not of 
concern due to the fact that I use differenced API scores in the “competitive effects” 
regression.  
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 Using the distance to the nearest charter school as the dependent variable, there 
are no key variables that turn out significant, supporting the idea that the distance from a 
TPS to the nearest charter is exogenously determined.  
 Finally, I run a probit regression with the dummy variable year_of on the left 
hand side. In this model, only the second lag of percent change API is significant, and is 
negative. The second lag’s negative coefficient indicates that API decline increases the 
likelihood that a charter school will be opened nearby in the next two years. While this is 
an interesting result, the fact that charters are generally planned more than two years 
before opening mitigates concerns of endogeneity. Furthermore, even if this were still a 
concern, controlling for lagged percent change in API in the competitive effects 
regression is likely sufficient to resolve the issue.  
 
Conclusion and Policy Recommendation 
  
There are a few main points to take away from this study that are applicable to 
education policy both in LA and around the country. First, according to this analysis, 
although charter schools generally test better than traditional public schools, they actually 
do not fare any better than TPSs once one controls for important variables.   
Second, charter schools appear to be strongly preferable to TPSs only in the case 
that the school is majority-black. In this case, though, they appear to greatly outperform 
their TPS counterparts. This is not to say that converting all majority-black schools to 
charters would strongly improve educational outcomes, though. There are certainly other 
factors contributing to this result beyond the charter-TPS distinction. It is important to 
further identify why it is that majority black charter schools do particularly well, and try 
to reproduce those factors in other schools.  
Third, individual charter schools tend to perform better if they have existed for a 
longer period of time. Thus, it could be that, with time to grow and evolve, charter 
schools might match or surpass TPSs in performance. Additional research should further 
investigate the link between years in existence and performance in both TPSs and charter 
schools.  
Fourth, conversion charter schools generally score higher on the API than startup 
charters. This may be due to the fact that conversion charters can be considered to have a 
“head start” on startup charters, with facilities and students often in place from the 
beginning. Perhaps school districts should focus more on converting low-performing 
TPSs to charters than creating entirely new charter schools.  
Finally, there is no evidence of a positive competitive effect from charter school 
openings; rather, the opening of charter schools is correlated with lower TPS 
performance. I argue that this result is likely due to a combination of loss of funding and 
loss of students with improvement potential.  
Maintaining a competitive school environment in which funding follows the 
student while not harming failing schools is a challenge for policymakers. I think that 
funding should continue to follow students. That being said, special attention should be 
paid to turning around failing schools that lose students. Perhaps some sort of hybrid 
scheme in which funding continues to follow students, but at a decreasing rate, would be 
desirable. Further research should better examine how to create a competitive system 
without overly punishing students and teachers at low-performing schools.  
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In terms of the possible loss of students with improvement potential, I do not 
think this is necessarily problematic. Motivated students and families should have the 
chance to change schools and maximize learning opportunities. Ultimately, mobility in 
public school education should lead to a more successful system.  
 The main conclusions from this study support the notion that we must use caution 
before declaring charter schools to be the solution to America’s primary education woes. 
This paper refutes, at least in the case of Los Angeles County, two claims often made by 
charter school advocates: first, that charter schools perform better than public schools, 
and second, that charter school openings induce TPSs to perform better. This does not 
mean that there is no role for charter schools to play in this country’s education reforms. 
It does mean, though, that we should seek to construct policies that will lead to charter 
school success while at the same time promoting the improvement of traditional public 
schools.    
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Appendix 
 
Table 1 
Column1 Charters 
    
TPSs 
API 788.92 719.92 
%∆API 3.7 1.92 
Enrollment 464.1 688.95 
% Free or Reduced 
Lunches 56% 66.30% 
% Minority 71.40% 81.10% 
Avg Class Size 20.78 21.9 
Pupils per Teacher 22.3 20.2 
 
 
 
Table 2: Base regression  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES API logAPI ∆API %∆API 
          
charter -6.958 -0.0143 -10.32* -0.649 
 (8.49) (0.0106) (6.071) (1.077) 
% on free meals -1.47*** -0.002*** -1.3** -0.203*** 
 (0.124) (0.000162) (0.117) (0.0177) 
% minority -.992*** -.00134*** -.791*** -0.100*** 
 (0.275 (0.000381) 0.237) (0.0378) 
Pupils per teacher 0.106 0.000117 0.0100 -0.00735 
 (0.174) (0.000218) (0.138) (0.0238) 
Number of teachers 0.667 0.000852 0.755 0.127 
 (0.809) (0.00112) (0.727) (0.112) 
enrollment -.0685* -.0001** -.068** -0.0109** 
 (0.0354) (4.82e-05) (0.0334) (0.00506) 
White 4.050 0.000237 6.312 1.657 
 (11.76) (0.0170) (10.59) (1.655) 
Asian 82.88*** 0.105*** 72.86*** 11.34*** 
 (7.587) (0.00946) (6.995) (1.039) 
Black -17.4*** -0.0251*** -19.8*** -3.513*** 
 (2.768) (0.00386) (2.670) (0.413) 
Other 67.83*** 0.0850*** 24.91*** 2.225*** 
 (14.18) (.015) (3.65) (.597) 
R-squared 0.760 0.737 0.836 0.818 
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
 
 
 
All regressions include fixed year effects. Four lagged values of the dependent 
variable are used in Columns 3 and 4.  
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Table 3: Base regression with charter interactions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES API logAPI ∆API %∆API 
charter -172*** -0.239*** -128.0** -17.65** 
 (41.49) (0.0506) (48.66) (8.084) 
% on free meals -1.47*** -.00197*** -1.31*** -0.203*** 
 (0.129) (0.000168) (0.122) (0.0181) 
% minority -1.05*** -.00142*** -.844*** -0.106** 
 (0.311) (0.00430) (0.264) (0.0420) 
Pupils per teacher 0.0780 8.75e-05 -0.0102 -0.0105 
 (0.163) (0.000207) (0.144) (0.0247) 
Number of teachers 0.673 0.000856 0.768 0.129 
 (0.796) (0.00111) (0.721) (0.111) 
enrollment -.0685* -.0001** -.0694** -.0109** 
 (0.0350) (4.77e-05) (0.0331) (0.00503) 
White 1.444 -0.00348 4.562 1.437 
 (12.99) (0.0188) (11.51) (1.814) 
Asian 82.47*** 0.104*** 73.15*** 11.34*** 
 (7.667) (0.00959) (7.057) (1.050) 
Black -23.2*** -0.0332*** -24.4*** -4.395*** 
 (3.290) (0.00445) (3.469) (0.491) 
Other 67.75*** 0.0849*** 24.77*** 2.179*** 
 (14.39) (0.0150) (3.724) (0.605) 
charterblack 51.32*** 0.0722*** 52.10*** 9.680*** 
 (13.93) (0.0184) (16.33) (3.247) 
charterwhite 87.58** 0.126*** 51.08 7.770 
 (35.51) (0.0468) (40.68) (7.290) 
charter% minority 1.315*** 0.00180*** 1.410*** 0.175*** 
 (0.254) (0.000341) (0.304) (0.0450) 
charter% on free meals 0.200 0.000331 -0.492 -0.0396 
 (0.405) (0.000532) (0.507) (0.0854) 
charter pupils per teacher 0.643 0.000580 0.599 0.0799 
 (.85) (.001) (.673) (.117) 
R-squared 0.762 0.739 0.838 0.819 
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
    
     
   
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
                                                                    
All regressions include fixed year effects. Four lagged values of the dependent 
variable are used in Columns 3 and 4.  
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Table 4: Comparing charter vs. 
TPS 
  TPS Charter TPS Charter 
VARIABLES API API %∆API %∆API 
          
% on free meals -1.45*** -1.293** -0.204*** -0.205** 
 (0.132) (0.410) (0.0184) (0.0715) 
% minority -1.08*** 0.152 -0.113*** 0.0268 
 (0.295) (0.277) (0.0397) (0.0351) 
Pupils per teacher -0.474 0.555 -0.0928 0.0530 
 (0.336) (0.825) (0.0580) (0.105) 
Number of teachers -0.70*** 0.0198 -0.091*** 0.0965 
 (0.151) (0.474) (0.0197) (0.0702) 
White 0.524 78.20* 1.253 6.080 
 (12.32) (37.76) (1.738) (6.658) 
Asian 81.60***  11.31***  
 (7.713)  (1.073)  
Black -22.4*** 33.62* -4.153*** 3.822 
 (3.330) (16.35) (0.506) (3.497) 
Other 68.06***  10.31*  
 (13.83)  (5.441)  
Observations 11,569 338 11,103 303 
R-squared 0.768 0.529 0.822 0.671 
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses 
    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
 
 
Table 5: TPS and Charter API performance by largest ethnic group 
Charter Schools  TPS  
Largest Ethnic 
Group 
 Mean 
API Largest Ethnic Group  
 Mean 
API 
Black 757.01 Black 663.72 
Latino 721.93 Latino 683.70 
White 858 White 831.57 
  Filipino 857.4 
  Asian 849.13 
 
 
 
All regressions include fixed year effects. Four lagged values of the dependent variable are 
used in Columns 3 and 4.  
Note: there are no majority Filipino or Asian charter schools  
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Table 6: Investigating the impact of years in existence and type (startup vs. conversion) 
on performance.  
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES API %∆API 
      
years_existed 1.405*** 0.0273 
 (0.376) (0.0750) 
startup -71.04* -7.682 
 (35.79) (5.450) 
% on free meals -0.994** -0.177** 
 (0.340) (0.0606) 
% minority 0.476* 0.0503 
 (0.222) (0.0391) 
Pupils per teacher -0.494 -0.0983 
 (0.867) (0.0711) 
Number of teachers -1.73*** -0.0822 
 (.294) (.048) 
White 71.29 5.091 
 (41.25) (8.274) 
Black 64.14*** 9.440** 
 (11.49) (2.753) 
R-squared 0.600 0.701 
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All regressions include fixed year effects. Four lagged values of the dependent variable 
are used in Columns 2.  
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Table 7: List of charter schools in LA County, and how often they appear as the “nearest” 
to a TPS 
Charter Frequency 
  
Academia Moderna 5 
Academia Semillas del Pueblo 7 
Accelerated 1 
Antelope Valley Learning Academy 1 
Ararat Charter 13 
Aveson School of Leaders 19 
Barack Obama Charter 108 
CHIME Institute's Schwarzenegger Commun 9 
CLAS Affirmation 4 
Camino Nuevo Academy #2 4 
Camino Nuevo Charter Academy 3 
Camino Nuevo Elementary No. 3 1 
Canyon Elementary 5 
Carpenter Community Charter 2 
Celerity Dyad Charter 7 
Celerity Nascent Charter 2 
Celerity Octavia Charter 15 
Celerity Troika Charter 30 
Center for Advanced Learning 2 
Children of Promise Preparatory Academy 2 
Citizens of the World Charter 2 
Colfax Charter Elementary 15 
Community Magnet Charter Elementary 1 
Equitas Academy Charter 2 
Fenton Avenue Charter 49 
Full Circle Learning Academy 20 
Futuro College Preparatory Elementary 44 
Gabriella Charter 7 
Garr Academy of Math and Entrepreneuria 3 
Global Education Academy 5 
Goethe International Charter 2 
ICEF Vista Elementary Academy 5 
Ingenium Charter 11 
Jardin de la Infancia 1 
KIPP Empower Academy 1 
KIPP Raices Academy 241 
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Larchmont Charter 2 
Larchmont Charter-West Hollywood 3 
Los Feliz Charter School for the Arts 6 
Magnolia Science Academy 7 11 
Marquez Avenue Elementary 3 
Milagro Charter 15 
Montague Charter Academy 15 
Multicultural Learning Center 7 
N.E.W. Academy Canoga Park 1 
N.E.W. Academy of Science and Arts 1 
New City 5 
Ocean Charter 5 
Open Charter Magnet 15 
Our Community Charter 13 
Pacoima Charter Elementary 1 
Palisades Charter Elementary 2 
San Jose Charter Academy 8 
Santa Monica Boulevard Community Charter 3 
Today's Fresh Start Charter 1 
Today's Fresh Start Charter School Inglewood 73 
Valley Charter Elementary 22 
View Park Preparatory Accelerated Chart 2 
Watts Learning Center 1 
Westwood Elementary 13 
Wilder's Preparatory Academy Charter 3 
Wisdom Academy for Young Scientists 13 
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Table 8: Assessing the impact of geographic proximity and opening of charter schools on 
TPS performance 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES        %∆API     %∆API 
      
distance_charter .0000339*** -.0000204 
 (8.78e-06) (1.13e-05) 
count_charter -0.0543** -0.0366** 
 (0.0239) (0.0170) 
year_of -0.217 -2.062*** 
 (0.852) (0.696) 
one_year_before 0.0858 -0.636 
 (0.793) (0.978) 
two_year_before -0.388 -1.547* 
 (0.585) (0.891) 
three_year_before 0.178 -1.116* 
 (0.487) (0.602) 
four_year_before 0.292 -0.226 
 (0.500) (0.508) 
one_years_after -1.060** -1.779** 
 (0.518) (0.689) 
two_years_after -0.401 -0.563 
 (0.886) (1.017) 
three_years_after -2.536*** -2.872*** 
 (0.660) (0.827) 
four_years_after -1.927*** -0.934 
 (0.697) (0.785) 
% minority -0.153*** -0.156*** 
 (0.0369) (0.0417) 
% on free meals -0.237*** -0.227*** 
 (0.0219) (0.0282) 
Pupils per teacher -0.0439 -0.139 
 (0.0353) (0.108) 
class_size -0.187 -0.234* 
 (0.117) (0.132) 
charter_enrollment  -0.00440*** 
  (0.00116) 
charter_% on free meals  -0.0295** 
  (0.0140) 
charter_% minority  -0.0140 
  (0.0204) 
charter_API  0.000843 
  (0.00393) 
R-squared 0.859 0.855 
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
     
 
    
     
All columns include fixed year effects and four lags of the dependent variable. Also 
included in the model are indicators for majority ethnic group and controls for the 
distance to the nearest private school, and number of private schools within 5 miles.  
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Table 9: Endogeneity check  
    
  (1) (2) (3)  
VARIABLES count distance year_of  
        
% on free meals 0.0747** -352.0*** -0.00398** 
 (0.0348) (130.9) (0.00185) 
% minority 0.0835* -626.6** 0.0116*** 
 (0.0444) (305.3) (0.00417) 
White 6.068*** -27,532*** 0.223 
 (2.256) (6,633) (0.221) 
Asian 1.983 5,480 -0.103 
 (1.671) (8,092) (0.100) 
Black 1.374 -13,395* 0.0753 
 (1.792) (7,977) (0.0780) 
Other 8.278*** -32,073***  
 (1.065) (6,442)  
API 0.00805 -104.4*** 0.000664 
 (0.00678) (31.79) (0.000656) 
APIlag -0.00739 7.759 -0.000647 
 (0.00462) (16.90) (0.000819) 
API2lag -0.00668*** 14.78 0.00126 
 (0.00240) (15.42) (0.000885) 
API3lag -0.00562** -12.29 -0.00176 
 (0.00254) (12.49) (0.00111) 
API4lag -0.00175 -4.457 -0.000779 
 (0.00421) (15.39) (0.000803) 
API5lag -0.00740*** 18.22 0.000500 
 (0.00189) (15.42) (0.000676) 
API6lag -0.0125** 7.613 -0.000952** 
 (0.00521) (13.61) (0.000482) 
%∆API  -0.0584** 72.30 -0.00183 
 (0.0290) (103.9) (0.00353) 
%∆API1lag -0.0510*** 72.64 -0.000596 
 (0.0171) (71.05) (0.00328) 
%∆API2lag -0.0457** -22.76 -0.0102** 
 (0.0200) (98.12) (0.00471) 
%∆API3lag -0.0406 74.19 -0.000955 
 (0.0272) (90.01) (0.00321) 
%∆API4lag -0.0655*** 115.4 0.00202 
 (0.0164) (94.45) (0.00404) 
%∆API5lag -0.0470** 37.28 -0.00302 
 (0.0235) (66.12) (0.00291) 
%∆API6lag 0.00951* 14.64 0.00131* 
 (0.00501) (17.09) (0.000696) 
    
R-squared 0.123 0.073  
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses 
   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
    
Year fixed effects are included in all models. Column 3 represents a probit 
model.  
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Figure 1: API distribution for charter schools 
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Figure 2: API distribution for traditional public schools  
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Figure 3: Distribution of Charter Schools’ Opening 
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Figure 4: Location of TPSs and charter schools in LA 
County 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Small circles represent traditional public elementary schools, while large squares represent 
elementary charter schools.   
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Figure 5: Histogram of distance from TPS to nearest charter school.  
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Figure 6: Histogram of the number of charter schools within 5 miles of TPS 
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